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INTRODUCTION
The image is familiar.  Half a dozen prisoners in orange
jumpsuits kneel in a small fenced-in gravel yard, hunched over
as if they had been punched in the stomach.  Their hands are
tied in front of them, and they wear heavy goggles, medical
masks, and silencing headphones.  Two men in camouflage
stand over the prisoners, their presence unacknowledged by
the men on the ground.  This photograph,1 one of the few taken
† B.A., Harvard College, 2013; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2016; Articles Edi-
tor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 101.  I would like to thank my parents, Andy
Mitran and Louise Dimiceli-Mitran, for their support and enthusiasm throughout
the writing process.  Additionally, I would like to thank Brad Ryba for the inspira-
tion and the members of the Cornell Law Review for their hard work.
1 See Shane T. McCoy, DUPLICATE: USA – Military – Guantanamo Bay De-
tainees, CORBIS IMAGES (Jan. 11, 2002), http://www.corbisimages.com/stock-
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inside Guantanamo Bay’s Camp X-Ray, provides a glimpse into
the U.S. government’s interrogation practices there.  The head-
phones and goggles deprive prisoners of sight and sound as an
interrogation technique.2  The sensory manipulations do not
stop there, though—detainees at Guantanamo Bay and other
detention centers are subjected to music torture, the practice
of blaring loud music for an extended period to wear down a
detainee’s defenses in preparation for interrogation.3
Although the issue of music torture has only recently come
into the public eye,4 such practices are not new.  As early as the
1950s, national security agencies in the United States, Ca-
nada, and the United Kingdom began funding research into
acoustical interrogation techniques.5  Some of these tech-
niques were included in a 1963 U.S. interrogation manual
called KUBARK.6  Although the KUBARK manual did not ex-
plicitly advocate for music torture in the form it is used today, it
recognized that sensory deprivation or “persistent manipula-
tion” of the interrogatees’ environments could induce “regres-
sion,” which would render interrogatees more cooperative
towards their interrogators, whom they would suddenly per-
ceive as “fatherly.”7  Incessant, deafening music could serve as
a “persistent manipulation” of environment that would induce
regression.
photo/rights-managed/42-16825137/duplicate-usa-military-guantanamo-bay-
detainees?popup=1 [http://perma.cc/RTE4-QCQF].
2 See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation
87–90 (1963) [hereinafter KUBARK] (“The deprivation of stimuli induces regres-
sion by depriving the subject’s mind of contact with an outer world and thus
forcing it in upon itself.  At the same time, the calculated provision of stimuli
during interrogation tends to make the regressed subject view the interrogator as
a father figure.  The result, normally, is a strengthening of the subject’s tenden-
cies toward compliance.”).
3 See Andy Worthington, A History of Music Torture in the “War on Terror,”
HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Jan. 15, 2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/andy-worthington/a-history-of-music-tortur_b_151109.html [http://per
ma.cc/8EU9-BPVF].
4 See Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee
063, TIME MAG., June 20, 2005, at 26, 26–33.  The Zagorin article brought Guan-
tanamo Bay interrogation practices squarely into public view by covering a de-
tainee’s detailed daily log of his experiences.  Notably, the log reported the use of
Christina Aguilera’s music during interrogation preparation.
5 Suzanne G. Cusick, “You Are in a Place that is Out of the World . . .”: Music
in the Detention Camps of the “Global War on Terror,” 2 J. SOC’Y FOR AM. MUSIC 1, 3
(2008).
6 See KUBARK, supra note 2, at 76–78, 87–90. R
7 Id.
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Perhaps because even the KUBARK manual recognized
that the “regression” process could be dangerous,8 many be-
lieve that the U.S. government banned the interrogation tech-
niques in the KUBARK manual following the Vietnam War.9
However, numerous scholars have found evidence that these
techniques continued to be taught to U.S. personnel in Georgia
and Latin America, as well as in the Special Forces training
curriculum.10  KUBARK interrogation techniques, including
“noise stress” methods, may have been brought to Guanta-
namo early in the war on global terror and from there they
disseminated to the expansive network of U.S. prisons in Iraq
and Afghanistan.11
Prisoners released from U.S. detention facilities like Guan-
tanamo Bay are required to sign nondisclosure agreements,
and some even receive warnings that if they disclose the condi-
tions of their imprisonment, they may be redetained for an
indefinite period.12  As such, it is difficult to get a complete
picture of the interrogation practices employed at U.S. deten-
tion centers.  However, scattered first-hand accounts have
emerged.  One of these accounts comes from Moazzam Begg, a
former prisoner who was detained in Bagram prison in 2002.13
Begg noted that newly arrived detainees were held for several
days inside plywood “isolation rooms” that measured approxi-
mately six feet by six feet.14  These prisoners were stripped
naked and subjected to constant, loud music, including songs
by the Bee Gees, Marilyn Manson, and Eminem.15  Even
outside the hot, dark, plywood boxes, the music could be heard
in the long-term prisoner pens at a level nearly as loud as that
in dance clubs.16  Begg remembers that it was “almost impossi-
ble to sleep.”17
Begg is far from the only former detainee to come forward
with reports of music torture.  Indeed, piecing together reports
from various sources, one publication was able to identify the
8 Id. at 78 (“Severe techniques of regression are best employed in the pres-
ence of a psychiatrist, to insure full reversal later.”).
9 Cusick, supra note 5, at 3. R
10 Id.
11 Jane Mayer, The Experiment, NEW YORKER, July 11, 2005, at 65.
12 Cusick, supra note 5, at 5. R
13 See generally MOAZZAM BEGG WITH VICTORIA BRITTAIN, ENEMY COMBATANT: MY
IMPRISONMENT AT GUANTA´NAMO, BAGRAM, AND KANDAHAR (2006).
14 Id. at 170; Cusick, supra note 5, at 6–7. R
15 BEGG, supra note 13, at 170; Cusick, supra note 5, at 6–7. R
16 Cusick, supra note 5, at 7. R
17 Id.
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“top ten” songs most frequently played at Guantanamo Bay.18
Music and sound torture is widespread in these detention facil-
ities because it is effective.  Research suggests that “either sen-
sory deprivation or sensory overload could be an extremely
quick way of breaking down a human being’s psychological
ability to orient him- or herself in reality, distinguish the hallu-
cinatory from the real, or resist interrogation.”19  One former
prisoner, Donald Vance, said that music torture made him sui-
cidal.20  “It sort of removes you from you,” Vance described.21
“You can no longer formulate your own thoughts when you’re
in an environment like that.”22  Ruhal Ahmed, another pris-
oner, said, “You’re in agony . . . .  It makes you feel like you are
going mad.”23  Begg noted that many of his peers were “ready to
tell the Americans anything they wanted, whether it was true or
not.”24
In late 2014, further evidence of the pervasiveness of music
torture surfaced when the U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence publicly released an edited version of its extensive
report of CIA torture techniques following the September 11
attacks.25  In the 525 publicly released pages, the committee
mentioned music torture seventeen times.26  The report de-
scribed loud rock music being used in CIA interrogation facili-
ties for sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation, and to increase
prisoners’ “sense of hopelessness.”27  Additionally, the report
noted that the CIA also sometimes used specific music “to sig-
18 Martyn McLaughlin, Rock Legends Want to Silence Guantanamo’s Torture
Tunes, SCOTSMAN (Dec. 10, 2008, 9:17 PM), http://www.scotsman.com/news/
rock-legends-want-to-silence-guantanamo-s-torture-tunes-1-1151076# [http://
perma.cc/9AHL-22U7] (identifying “Enter Sandman” by Metallica, “Bodies” by
Drowning Pool, “Shoot to Thrill” by AC/DC, “Hell’s Bells” by AC/DC, “I Love You”
from the Barney and Friends children’s television show, “Born in the USA” by
Bruce Springsteen, “We Are the Champions” by Queen, “Babylon” by David Gray,
“White America” by Eminem, and “Sesame Street” from the Sesame Street chil-
dren’s television show as Guantanamo’s Top Ten).
19 Cusick, supra note 5, at 4. R
20 Musicians Don’t Want Tunes Used for Torture, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 9,
2008, 5:48 PM), http://www.today.com/id/28144557#.VEqQYYvF9Uo [http://
perma.cc/2FJE-USQV] [hereinafter Tunes for Torture].
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Cusick, supra note 5, at 7. R
25 See S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMM. STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION & INTERROGATION PROGRAM (2012).
26 See id.
27 Id. at 29.
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nal to a detainee that another interrogation was about to
begin.”28
As soon as music torture came into the public eye,29 musi-
cians began expressing their disapproval.  Trent Reznor of Nine
Inch Nails has been an outspoken opponent of music torture,
writing, “It’s difficult for me to imagine anything more pro-
foundly insulting, demeaning and enraging than discovering
music you’ve put your heart and soul into creating has been
used for purposes of torture.”30  In 2008, Tom Morello (formerly
of Rage Against the Machine) and Massive Attack launched a
campaign against music torture that involved holding mo-
ments of silence during their concerts on tour.31  Morello
stated, “The fact that music I helped create was used in crimes
against humanity sickens me—we need to end torture and
close Guantanamo now.”32
Not every artist objects to her music being used for interro-
gation purposes, however.  James Hetfield of Metallica purport-
edly remarked, “If the Iraqis aren’t used to freedom, then I’m
glad to be part of their exposure.”33  Stevie Benton of Drowning
Pool is also supportive.34  These proponents are likely in the
minority, though.  In 2009, a coalition of musicians including
Trent Reznor, Tom Morello, Pearl Jam, R.E.M., Jackson
Browne, Rise Against, Rosanne Cash, Billy Bragg, and the
Roots joined the National Campaign to Close Guantanamo.35
Collectively, they endorsed a Freedom of Information Act re-
quest for government records of the music used during
interrogations.36
Although artists may be outraged, there is unfortunately
very little that they can do to prevent Guantanamo Bay from
28 Id. at 429.
29 See supra note 4. R
30 John Tehranian, Guantanamo’s Greatest Hits: The Semiotics of Sound and
the Protection of Performer Rights Under the Lanham Act, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 11, 20 (2013).
31 Tunes for Torture, supra note 20.  Christopher Cerf, writer of the Sesame
Street theme, also agrees with Morello, remarking, “I wouldn’t want my music to
be a party to that.” Id.
32 Sam Stein, Music Stars Demand Records on Bush Administration’s Use of
Music for Torture, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/2009/10/21/music-stars-demand-record_n_329476.html [http://
perma.cc/W5ZA-FE5Z].
33 Lane DeGregory, Iraq ‘n’ Roll, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 21, 2004) http://www
.sptimes.com/2004/11/21/Floridian/Iraq__n__roll.shtml [http://perma.cc/X5
2V-FCYM].
34 Tunes for Torture, supra note 20. R
35 Stein, supra note 32. R
36 Id.
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using their music under the United States’ current intellectual
property system.  Part I of this Note explores the applicability of
various spheres of intellectual property, including copyright,
trademark, and publicity protections, and ultimately concludes
that none of these fields appropriately protects artists in the
music torture context.  Part II of this Note describes an alluring
alternative that would give artists relief from unwanted uses of
their music—moral intellectual property.  Part III examines
how moral intellectual property protections could fit into the
scheme of existing U.S. intellectual property law.
I
CURRENT U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
IS NOT A SOLUTION
A. Copyright Protection
Technically, a musical composer could likely bring a copy-
right infringement claim against the U.S. government to enjoin
its use of the composer’s song in the interrogation context.
Musical composers have an exclusive right to public perform-
ance of their works,37 where “public performance” is defined as
a performance “or display . . . at any place where a substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances is gathered.”38  In an interrogation scena-
rio similar to the one described by Begg, then, where interro-
gators blasted music so that it could be heard by many
prisoners in different cells,39 the government has likely en-
gaged in a public performance and has therefore infringed on
the composer’s copyright.40
Even so, copyright law does not provide near-perfect pro-
tection for artists against use of their music in music torture.
First, mere performers have no copyright infringement rights in
this scenario.  Creators of sound recordings, unlike creators of
musical compositions, enjoy exclusive rights to public perform-
ance only in the limited context of digital audio transmis-
sions.41  Today, hired writers pen a number of the “Top Forty”
37 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012).
38 Id. § 101.
39 See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
40 Note, however, that if the music were only able to be heard by one prisoner
at a time, there would likely be no public performance because such a perform-
ance would be neither “open to the public” nor performed for “a substantial
number of persons.”  17 U.S.C. § 101.  In that scenario, there would be no copy-
right infringement, and the composer would have no remedy.
41 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
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hits.42  The Top Forty artists, with whom these works are
widely associated, have no right under copyright law to enjoin a
public performance.  Second, any copyright suit against a U.S.
military installation in a foreign country would run up against
complicated jurisdictional issues.43  While jurisdictional issues
are not an insurmountable barrier to a successful copyright
suit, the increased cost of litigation may be prohibitively expen-
sive for some artists.
Finally, most copyright-owning musical artists in the
United States have blanket licensing agreements with the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (AS-
CAP); Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI); or the Society of European
Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC).44  Artists transfer their
copyright or public performance right to these blanket-licens-
ing organizations, and the organizations provide consumers
access to their vast catalogues of music in exchange for a fee,
out of which the organizations compensate the artists.45  These
organizations must license public performance rights for their
members’ work to anyone willing to pay the rates.46  As such,
artists that take advantage of these organizations’ services
could not choose to deny public performance rights for use in
Guantanamo Bay if the United States were willing to pay the
licensing fee.  Of course, artists could choose not to register
their works with ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC, but these organiza-
tions are nearly ubiquitous in the music industry, and failure
to register would vastly, perhaps prohibitively, increase artists’
transaction costs.47
Ultimately, then, copyright protection does not provide
musicians with adequate protection against unwanted employ-
ment of their music in music torture.  Noncomposers and
42 See John Seabrook, Is Pop Music Fake?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/is-pop-music-fake [http://
perma.cc/CU9J-UYK5].
43 See Tehranian, supra note 30, at 22 n.66 for a detailed discussion of the R
jurisdictional barriers potential litigants would face in bringing a copyright suit
against Guantanamo Bay.
44 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 588 n.31 (6th ed. 2012).
45 Id.
46 See Hannah Karp & Brent Kendall, Justice Department to Review Music-
Fee System, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2014, 12:09 AM), http://online.wsj.com/arti
cles/justice-department-to-review-music-fee-system-1401854888 [http://perma
.cc/922V-U4NP].
47 See id. (predicting that withdrawing from licensing agreements with ASCAP
or BMI would be complicated and labor intensive); MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY,
supra note 44, at 588 n.31 (noting that ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC typically handle R
blanket licenses).
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members of blanket-licensing organizations are left exposed.
Infringement cases can only go forward in the face of complex
jurisdictional issues and only if the torture amounted to a pub-
lic performance.
B. Protection Under the Lanham Act
Especially in cases where artists cannot boast a valid copy-
right, some courts have used trademark law48 to protect an
artist from unwanted uses of her work.  For example, in Gilliam
v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., the Second Circuit
held that the Monty Python Comedy Troupe could successfully
enjoin ABC from broadcasting truncated and content-edited
Monty Python episodes under the Lanham Act.49
While sympathetic judges may sometimes stretch the Lan-
ham Act to provide protections for artists, trademark law is, at
its root, ill suited to protect the integrity of artists’ works.
Trademark law grew out of a desire to prevent unfair deception
to commercial consumers and prohibit unfair competition be-
tween retailers.50  At best, the doctrine is an “imperfect fit” to
protect artists from unwanted public performances of their
works.51
Perhaps because the Lanham Act was not originally in-
tended to provide protection for artistic works, decisions apply-
ing the Lanham Act in that context have been “incongruous
and unpredictable.”52  To succeed on a Lanham Act claim for
performance protection under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), plaintiffs
must show that (1) the performance at issue constituted a pro-
tectable, source-identifying mark, and (2) the defendant’s activ-
ities created a likelihood of consumer confusion as to
sponsorship or endorsement.53  Courts have not been uniform
in applying either element.  For example, in Oliveira v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., the Second Circuit refused to hold that Astrud Gil-
berto’s signature performance of “The Girl from Ipanema” was a
protectable mark.54  Gilberto was therefore without Lanham
Act protection against a Lay’s potato chips advertisement that
used the song without authorization.55  However, in Waits v.
48 Federal trademark law is codified in the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051–1127 (2012).  Individual states may also provide trademark protections.
49 538 F.2d 14, 25–26 (2d Cir. 1976).
50 MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 765. R
51 Tehranian, supra note 30, at 27. R
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 251 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2001).
55 Id. at 63.
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Frito-Lay, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that Tom Waits’s raspy
vocal style constituted a protectable mark, and that a sound-
alike singer in a Doritos chips commercial created a likelihood
of consumer confusion as to Tom Waits’s endorsement.56
These decisions contradict one another—how could a mere imi-
tation of an artist’s singing style more strongly invoke an art-
ist’s endorsement in the minds of consumers than a famous,
signature performance by the artist herself?57
Some of the discontinuity in Lanham Act decisions likely
stems from the tension between the instinct to grant artists
protections on one hand and the fear of disrupting the existing
intellectual property system on the other.  Granting expansive
artist protections under the Lanham Act “would be profoundly
disruptive to commerce.”58  Artists already protected under the
Copyright Act would try to assert additional rights under the
Lanham Act, and “[i]mmense unforeseen liabilities might ac-
crue, upsetting reasonable commercial expectations.”59  Fur-
ther, artists would likely try to protect otherwise copyrightable
works under trademark law so that they might skirt the consti-
tutionally mandated copyright duration limitations.60  As
much as it may be tempting to stretch existing Lanham Act
provisions to protect artists’ rights to choose how their works
56 978 F.2d 1093, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 1992).
57 Grappling with the contradiction presented by these two cases, the court in
Henley v. DeVore held that
the distinction between Waits and Oliveira is that in Waits, the
defendants imitated Waits’s voice in a manner leading consumers to
believe that Waits was actually singing and endorsing their product,
whereas in Oliveira, the defendants simply used a recording of a
prior musical performance. . . .  [T]he mere use of the celebrity’s
prior performance does not present the same sort of confusion [as is
created by a sound-alike singer].
733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  The court did not consider, how-
ever, that consumers might believe that if a performer grants permission to use
her recording in a commercial, that performer is endorsing the product.  Further,
even the best sound-alike singers cannot do perfect imitations, and consumers
might well recognize the vocal discrepancy.  It is equally logical, then, to assume
that a signature performance would invoke endorsement more than a sound-alike
performance in the minds of consumers.  Likely, the Waits and Oliveira decisions
are simply at odds.
58 Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 63.
59 Id.
60 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to grant copy-
rights only for “limited Times”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208
(2003) (holding that a copyright duration limitation of life of the author plus
seventy years is constitutional).
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are used, a better solution is to grant artists protections under
a provision better tailored to that purpose.61
C. Right to Publicity
The state law right to publicity should be briefly men-
tioned.  Although it is inapplicable in the music torture context
(it generally applies only when an artist’s name, image, or voice
is used in advertising or commerce), musicians sometimes use
the right to publicity to prevent their works from being used in
ways the artists find displeasing.62  Critics have argued that,
like trademark protection, right to publicity protection is ill-
suited to protect artists from unwanted uses of their works,
and they warn that undue expansion of the publicity right
could undermine the intellectual property balance.63  Further,
an expansive right to publicity could run into sticky preemp-
tion issues with the Lanham Act.64  Accordingly, like trade-
mark protection, the right to publicity is inadequate to protect
artists’ rights.
II
AN ALLURING ALTERNATIVE: MORAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. An Introduction to Moral Intellectual Property
In the United States, the intellectual property system pro-
tects authors’ economic rights almost exclusively, neglecting
moral or personality rights.  U.S. copyright law seeks to incen-
tivize artistic creation for the purposes of enriching the Ameri-
61 It is worth noting that while this discussion focused on claims for trade-
mark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), it is also conceivable that in the
music torture context, an artist would bring a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c),
alleging dilution by tarnishment.  This artist would allege that the use of his
music for torture purposes “harms the reputation” of his famous mark.  15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(2)(C) (2012).  Such a claim, though, would likely fail for two reasons.
First, to state a claim for dilution by tarnishment, a plaintiff must demonstrate
“likelihood of damage to its reputation.”  Newsboys v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.,
No. 3:12–cv–0678, 2013 WL 3524615, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. July 11, 2013).  Because
information about music torture is classified by the United States government, it
is unlikely that a plaintiff could demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of reputa-
tional damage.  Second, “noncommercial use” of a mark is not considered trade-
mark dilution.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C).  Likely, the government’s use of music
for interrogation would be deemed a noncommercial use.
62 See, e.g., Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 57–58, 63–64 (finding that Gilberto stated a
claim for a right to publicity violation under New York law when Frito-Lay used
her signature performance of “The Girl from Ipanema” in an advertisement).
63 See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity
“Wheel” Spun Out of Control, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 329, 422 (1997).
64 Id. at 387.
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can public.65  As Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes put it,
“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors.”66
Elsewhere in the world, however, the theoretical underpin-
nings of intellectual property rights are not solely utilitarian.
These countries, France and Germany for example, award
moral intellectual property rights.67  Moral intellectual prop-
erty rights stem from the idea that when an artist creates an
artwork, he puts a piece of himself into that work such that any
subsequent harm to it would also harm the artist.68  As Simon
Marion, a renowned sixteenth-century French lawyer argued,
as “the heavens and the earth belong to [God], because they are
the work of his word . . . [s]o the author of a book is its complete
master, and as such can dispose of it as he chooses.”69  Such
an idea is compatible with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s
famous personhood perspective of property,70 which posits
that artistic creations are bound up with the creator’s per-
sonhood in such a way that the artwork is valuable to the
artist’s sense of self.
Moral intellectual property schemes can vest authors with
a number of different rights.  At the heart of the bundle of
moral rights are the rights of attribution and integrity.71  The
right of attribution, also known as the right of paternity, is an
author’s right to control where and how her name is affixed to
her work (or not affixed if she wishes to remain anonymous).72
The right of attribution recognizes that when an artist ex-
presses herself artistically, she puts herself in a uniquely vul-
nerable position.73  Attribution rights help protect the artist,
making sure her name is “attributed to all her work and her
65 MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 436. R
66 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
67 See Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 44 & n.23 (1998) (citing French and German laws prohibiting
artists from waiving moral rights).
68 Cassandra Spangler, Comment, The Integrity Right of an MP3: How the
Introduction of Moral Rights into U.S. Law Can Help Combat Illegal Peer-to-Peer
Music File Sharing, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1299, 1301 (2009).
69 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284 (1970).
70 See generally GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
(Thom Brooks ed., 2012) (arguing that a person becomes a real self only by
engaging in a relationship with external property).
71 Spangler, supra note 68, at 1302. R
72 Id.
73 Liemer, supra note 67, at 47. R
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work only.”74  The right of integrity, by contrast, protects an
artist’s right to prevent others from altering his work without
his permission.75  This protects the artist’s reputation by en-
suring that his name is not attached to something he did not
create.76  It is not clear whether the right of integrity prevents a
purchaser from destroying a work entirely.77
Moral intellectual property schemes may also protect other
artist rights.  For example, a bundle of moral intellectual prop-
erty rights may include the right of disclosure, which is the
right to decide when a work is released to the public.78  Moral
intellectual property schemes may also protect the right of
withdrawal—the right to determine if a work should be recalled
because it no longer reflects the views of the artist.79  Further,
moral schemes can provide for resale royalties to artists, as
well as prohibit excessive criticism or personal attacks on the
author.80  In their purest form, moral intellectual rights are
also perpetual, nonwaivable, and nontransferable.81
Moral intellectual property protection is historically a con-
tinental-European phenomenon.82  The French legal system
awards the strongest existing protection for moral rights, per-
haps because moral protection developed in France as early as
the nineteenth century.83  Known as “droit moral,” France’s
moral rights doctrine protects artists’ rights of attribution, in-
tegrity, and disclosure.84  Additionally, droit moral rights are
perpetual and inalienable.85  Germany and Italy also provide
expansive moral rights protection.86  In fact, as of 2003, eighty-
one countries around the world, including Canada and Mexico,
recognized some form of moral protection for artists.87
Moral rights laws can provide powerful protection for art-
ists.  For example, in 1953, a French court enjoined Twentieth
Century Fox from screening its anti-Soviet film The Iron Curtain
after Russian composer Dmitry Shostakovich sued the film dis-
74 Id. at 49.
75 Spangler, supra note 68, at 1302. R
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1302–03.
81 Id. at 1303–04.
82 Id. at 1305.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair
Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 87–88 (1996).
87 Spangler, supra note 68, at 1305. R
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tributor for infringing upon his moral rights by using his music
in the movie.88  The court determined that Shostakovich suf-
fered moral damage because the presence of his music in the
film falsely indicated to consumers that Shostakovich endorsed
and approved of the anti-Russian themes espoused in the
film.89  Conversely, when Shostakovich brought suit in the
United States under the same facts, the court afforded him no
relief.90
B. Moral Intellectual Property in the United States
The copyright scheme in the United States is modeled
closely after the English Statute of Anne.91  The Statute of
Anne, passed by Parliament in 1710, awarded authors monop-
olies over their works for a period of fourteen years for the
utilitarian purpose of encouraging authors to create works for
the public benefit.92  After the Revolutionary War, many of the
newly created American states adopted copyright statutes sim-
ilar to the Statute of Anne, but there were problems enforcing
these statutes across state lines.93  To promote uniformity, the
Constitution granted Congress the power to create patents and
copyrights.94  The first Congress passed the Copyright Act of
1790, which, like the Statute of Anne, granted authors of
books, maps, and charts a fourteen-year monopoly on their
works.95  Since that time, American jurisprudence has empha-
sized the Statute of Anne’s utilitarian rationale for copyright
protection.96
There are a number of reasons that moral protections for
artists did not subsequently develop in the United States.  Per-
haps because the United States is a young country, its early
culture focused more on industry, trade, and economic devel-
88 See Yonover, supra note 86, at 89 & n.48; see also Shostakovich v. Twenti- R
eth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576–77 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff’d, 87
N.Y.S.2d 430 (App. Div. 1949) (mem.) (reciting the same facts in a parallel case
brought in New York).
89 See Yonover, supra note 86, at 89. R
90 Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
91 MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 431. R
92 Id. at 431–32; Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne)
1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.); see Yonover, supra note 86, at 86 n.34. R
93 MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 432. R
94 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
95 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; 8 Ann., c. 19; MERGES, MENELL &
LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 432. R
96 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
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opment than on art.97  “While European culture was marked
with the works of great authors and artists, the culture of the
United States was filled with names like Ford, Carnegie, and
Rockefeller who were leaders in industry.”98  Consistent with
this culture, utilitarian rationales for copyright protection
eclipsed moral ones.99  Additionally, Americans value First
Amendment free speech and expression highly, and some
moral protections tend to prioritize artists’ reputation and in-
tegrity over free expression.100  France, Germany, and Italy, the
countries that provide the most stringent moral rights laws,
lack speech protections analogous to the First Amendment.101
Things began to change in the late 1980s, when the United
States became a signatory of the Berne Convention.102  The
Berne Convention is an international copyright agreement that
was first ratified in 1886 and, as of 2007, had been signed by
no fewer than 163 countries.103  The United States delayed
signing the Berne Convention in part because the agreement
requires signatories to provide the moral rights of integrity and
attribution to their artists.104  However, facing pressure to ex-
tend protection for U.S. intellectual property abroad, the
United States officially joined the Berne Convention in 1989.105
To bring the United States into compliance with the Berne
Convention, Congress needed to make a number of changes to
U.S. copyright law.106  The Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1990
(VARA)107 brought the United States into greater compliance
97 Spangler, supra note 68, at 1306. R
98 Kimberly Y.W. Holst, A Case of Bad Credit?: The United States and the
Protection of Moral Rights in Intellectual Property Law, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
105, 122 (2006).
99 See Spangler, supra note 68, at 1307 (“U.S. law developed appropriately R
with this historical focus on industry and lack of artistic tradition, providing more
protection for property rights and less protection for the arts.” (footnote omitted));
Yonover, supra note 86, at 91. R
100 Yonover, supra note 86, at 92–93. R
101 Id.
102 Spangler, supra note 68, at 1307. R
103 Id.
104 See id.; see also S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 9 (1988) (“Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention requires that member States recognize, independently of the author’s
economic rights, that ‘the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.’”).
105 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.);
MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 433. R
106 See generally Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988.
107 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 15 11-JAN-16 13:35
2016] FACING THE MUSIC 519
with the Convention’s moral rights requirements.  Although
VARA applies only to “work[s] of visual art”—the definition of
which excludes technical drawings, audiovisual works, promo-
tional materials, and works made for hire—it provides visual
artists with attribution and integrity rights.108  Artists have the
right, therefore, to decide when their names attach to their
visual works and to prevent subsequent alteration or mutila-
tion of these pieces.109  Additionally, works of a “recognized
stature” cannot be destroyed over the artist’s objection.110
Works created after June 1, 1991, receive protection during the
author’s lifetime.111  VARA rights are waivable, but not
transferrable.112
Additionally, several states have VARA-like moral rights
statutes.  At the time VARA was enacted, eleven states had
moral rights statutes: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.113  These statutes offer
varying degrees of moral rights protection.114  However, like
VARA, these statutes apply only to visual works, and VARA
may or may not preempt them.115
VARA was a positive step towards Berne compliance, but
“[i]t is doubtful . . . that [the] collection of protections [under
VARA and other United States law] fully discharged U.S. obliga-
tions under the Berne Convention.”116  VARA rights, after all,
apply to only a small class of artists.117  Congress, however,
believes that United States law, even pre-VARA, sufficiently
protects artists’ rights to integrity and attribution under the
Berne Convention.  In the Senate report accompanying passage
of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Congress
opined that Berne was satisfied because
existing U.S. law includes various provisions of the Copyright
Act and Lanham Act, various state statutes, and common law
principles such as libel, defamation, misrepresentation, and
unfair competition, which have been applied by courts to
108 Id. §§ 101, 106A(a); MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 595. R
109 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
110 Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
111 Id. § 106A(d)(1); MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 595. R
112 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
113 Yonover, supra note 86, at 95–96. R
114 Id. at 96–97.
115 Spangler, supra note 68, at 1308–09. R
116 MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 594 n.33. R
117 Id. at 594–95.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 16 11-JAN-16 13:35
520 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:505
redress authors’ invocation of the right to claim authorship
or the right to object to distortion.118
This is illogical.  As we have seen, the Copyright Act and the
Lanham Act provide incomplete moral rights protections.119
State moral rights statutes, where they exist, cover only visual
artists.120  Further, common-law principles afford next to no
protection.  Moral rights are an invention of civil law, and they
are not contemplated by the economically motivated common-
law scheme.121  “[M]oral rights did not exist at common law, so
it is nonsensical to argue they are protected by common-law
causes of action.”122
The United States, then, is likely out of compliance with
the terms of the Berne Convention.  The U.S. government fails
to provide moral intellectual property rights to many of its art-
ists—for example, in the case of music torture.  The obvious
solution to both of these problems is for Congress to provide all
artists—not just visual artists, but musicians, filmmakers, and
performers alike—with moral intellectual property rights.
III
IMPLEMENTING EXPANDED MORAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Scope
In the United States, “[t]he economic interests protected by
the copyright laws are intertwined substantially with the per-
sonal interests that are the focus of the moral right doc-
trine.”123  Indeed, federal copyright law would likely preempt
most state-granted moral rights protections.124  This makes in-
tuitive sense—the personality interests inherent in moral
rights protections are at odds with the economic concerns that
dominate United States copyright legislation.  Rather than
fighting against copyright law, then, U.S. legislators should
incorporate moral intellectual property law into the Copyright
118 S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 9–10 (1988).
119 See supra subparts I.A–B.
120 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. R
121 See Spangler, supra note 68, at 1310–11. R
122 Id. at 1311.
123 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 38 (1985).
124 See id. at 91 (“State protection of most moral rights is inappropriate either
because such protection would vindicate rights ‘equivalent’ to those protected by
the 1976 [Copyright] Act or would conflict with the overall federal scheme of
copyright protection. . . . [F]ederal safeguards would provide the most extensive
form of protection for creators’ personal rights.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 17 11-JAN-16 13:35
2016] FACING THE MUSIC 521
Act, just as they incorporated VARA.  This approach not only
skirts preemption concerns but also ensures that the balance
of intellectual property law in the United States is not unduly
upset.  Just as expanding Lanham Act protections to protect
artists would destabilize the U.S. intellectual property
scheme,125 creating a moral intellectual property statute sepa-
rate from the Copyright Act could weaken copyright law and
upset consumer expectations.  The solution, then, is to incor-
porate moral rights protections into existing copyright law.
Congress derives its power to protect copyrights from the
Constitution, which grants Congress the power to “promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.”126
Accordingly, “Congress has the power to protect moral rights so
long as it concurrently fosters the constitutional goal of pro-
moting the useful arts.”127  Courts have been quite liberal in
interpreting Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause—in
Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, for exam-
ple, the Fifth Circuit ruled that even protection of obscene writ-
ings furthers the constitutional end of promoting the useful
arts.128  Protecting moral rights would serve the twin goals of
safeguarding the country’s cultural heritage by ensuring that
the country’s artworks are not altered or destroyed, and en-
couraging creativity by incentivizing artists through increased
protections for their works.129  Because moral rights therefore
promote the progress of the useful arts in two ways, Congress
likely has constitutional authority to incorporate moral rights
into the Copyright Act.
Categorizing moral rights as a subset of copyright law
places inherent limitations on the potential scope of moral
rights protection.  For example, the copyright clause authorizes
Congress to grant copyright protections only for “limited
Times.”130  Therefore, in contrast to the scheme in France,131
moral rights in the United States could not be perpetual.132
Furthermore, a perpetual moral intellectual property rights
system would run counter to the popular American belief that
the appropriate copyright duration should strike a balance be-
125 See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
127 Kwall, supra note 123, at 70. R
128 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979).
129 See Kwall, supra note 123, at 70. R
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
131 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. R
132 See Kwall, supra note 123, at 70. R
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tween incentivizing artistic creation and enriching the public
domain.133  Congress most recently determined that the life-
time of the author plus seventy years was the duration that
best achieved this balance,134 the likely rationale being that
parents are incentivized to provide for the descendants they
know during those descendants’ lifetimes, but have less incen-
tive to provide for family members they will not live long enough
to meet.135  A shorter duration would decrease artistic incen-
tives, but a longer duration would be detrimental to the public
domain.  Congress could determine that moral rights should be
protected for a similar time period—relatives that knew the
artist would be the most likely to be offended if the artist’s
reputation were injured, and would likely be able to make attri-
bution and integrity determinations that would comport with
the artist’s wishes.  More distant relatives would have less in-
terest in the artist’s moral rights, so would not need moral
rights protections.  However, Congress might also choose to
protect works only during the lifetime of the author, as it did in
VARA.136
A U.S. moral rights statute would likely provide more lim-
ited protection than some of the moral rights schemes abroad.
Sometimes included in the bundle of moral intellectual prop-
erty rights is the right to resale profits.137  In the United States,
however, the “first sale” doctrine establishes that once a copy-
righted work is sold, the buyer has exclusive domain to keep or
resell the work.138  Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate
that the first sale doctrine is a highly valued part of the Ameri-
can copyright scheme.139  Likely, then, the right to resale prof-
its would be excluded in U.S. moral intellectual property law.
133 See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 529. R
134 See id. at 528.
135 See 144 CONG. REC. S12,377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch) (stating the need to extend the duration of copyright “to provide
adequate protection for American creators and their heirs” because of “the effect
of demographic trends, such as increasing longevity and the trend toward rearing
children later in life”); see also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE BERNE
CONVENTION § 7.4 (1978) (stating that the duration of copyright for the Berne
Convention was chosen not by chance but because “most countries have felt it fair
and right that the average lifetime of an author and his direct descendants should
be covered”).
136 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. R
137 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. R
138 Spangler, supra note 68, at 1314. R
139 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363–71 (2013)
(holding that the first sale doctrine allows foreign-printed textbooks to be privately
imported and sold in the United States, despite the copyright holder’s
nonimportation right under 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2)).
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Similarly, moral intellectual property rights sometimes in-
clude a prohibition against excessive criticism or attacks on the
artist’s personality.140  In the United States, however, such a
prohibition could violate a critic’s First Amendment rights.141
Likely, then, the prohibition against excessive criticism would
also be excluded from the U.S. moral intellectual property
scheme.
Taking these exclusions into account, the bundle of moral
rights in the United States would likely include the right to
attribution and the right to integrity.  These two moral rights
are commonly awarded abroad and form the backbone of moral
intellectual property.142  They are also the two rights that the
Berne Convention requires143 and those that the United States
has already awarded visual artists under VARA.144  Disclosure
and withdrawal rights could also potentially be included in the
bundle of U.S. moral intellectual property rights, but their in-
clusion would be somewhat more disruptive to consumer ex-
pectations.  It would certainly fly in the face of today’s business
conventions if artists suddenly had the power to repossess art
they had previously sold to consumers.  Such a right would
disrupt the economic incentives of current U.S. copyright law
and would likely be much more difficult for Congress to push
through.  However, there is some precedent for U.S. legislation
allowing conditional transfer of copyrighted works.  Under
§ 203 of the Copyright Act,145 if an artist transfers her copy-
right by contract, she has an inalienable right to terminate that
contract during a five-year window that starts thirty-five years
after the contract’s execution.146  This right does not serve an
economic purpose—a contractual copyright transfer is less val-
uable if it can be summarily terminated after thirty-five years.
However, the right to terminate transfer is an enduring part of
the Copyright Act, suggesting that moral withdrawal rights
may not be an impossible addition to the U.S. copyright
scheme.
Unlike the rights afforded visual artists in VARA, U.S.
moral intellectual property rights should be inalienable and
unwaivable.  “[A] freely alienable moral right disserves the very
140 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. R
141 See John T. Cross, Reconciling the “Moral Rights” of Authors with the First
Amendment Right of Free Speech, 1 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 185, 190–91 (2007).
142 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. R
143 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. R
144 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. R
145 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
146 Id. § 203(a)(3).
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interests that the right seeks to protect because producers and
publishers usually enjoy a superior bargaining position and
will always secure releases of a creator’s moral rights during
the initial contract negotiations.”147  However, a completely in-
alienable moral right hinders the freedom of negotiations,
which could result in fewer contracts and fewer artistic cre-
ations to enrich the public domain.148  To address this prob-
lem, France, which awards its artists unwaivable and
inalienable moral rights, “tends to enforce contracts allowing
reasonable alterations that do not distort the spirit of the crea-
tor’s work, particularly with respect to adaptations and contri-
butions to collective works.”149  U.S. courts should also adopt
this flexible approach to inalienability, which would maximize
artistic creation while protecting artists’ personality rights.
So, Congress should pass a VARA-like amendment to the
Copyright Act that provides the unwaivable and inalienable
moral intellectual property rights of attribution and integrity
(and perhaps withdrawal and disclosure) to all artists, visual
and otherwise, for some limited period of time.  It sounds
straightforward, but there are still a few wrinkles.  First, critics
argue that the expansion of intellectual property rights in the
United States would disrupt the flow of commerce, especially
by undercutting blanket licensing music organizations such as
ASCAP and BMI.150  This is true enough—even setting aside
withdrawal rights, the attribution right complicates the blan-
ket-licensing process.  Once artists may choose whether or not
to affix their names to their works for each placement, and once
artists start to deny individual placements because consumers
would falsely assume artist endorsement,151 the blanket-li-
censing regime begins to falter.  However, in the United States’
economically motivated intellectual property system, it would
be exceedingly difficult to introduce a moral rights regime with-
out making certain economic changes.  Some alterations are
warranted if they protect artists’ important personality inter-
ests.  That is, “it is unclear just why economic rights, and doc-
147 Kwall, supra note 123, at 95 (footnote omitted). R
148 Id. at 94–95.
149 Id. at 13.
150 Tehranian, supra note 30, at 34–35. R
151 Artists gain this latter right as part of their right to attribution.  In the
Shostakovich case, for example, a French court determined that a false attribution
of artist endorsement damaged the artist’s moral rights. See notes 88–90 and
accompanying text.
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trines protecting them, ought to be prioritized above other
rights.”152
Both traditional copyright and moral intellectual property
rights necessarily limit free speech—artists cannot express
themselves through art if that expression would encroach on
another’s intellectual property—so a brief discussion of the
First Amendment is warranted.  Likely, though, free speech
concerns would not be a major barrier to implementing a moral
intellectual property system in the United States.
“Courts . . . have been fairly uniform in rejecting First Amend-
ment defenses in copyright cases,”153 and “the Supreme Court
is convinced that copyright law is constitutional.”154  Moral
rights do not seem to pose more of a First Amendment problem
than does traditional copyright.  Indeed, a recent analysis by
Professor John T. Cross demonstrates that almost all state and
federal moral rights protections currently in force satisfy First
Amendment requirements, with very few exceptions.155
Parody doctrine poses another potential problem.  A par-
ody is an artwork that seeks to comment upon or criticize an
existing work by mimicking it.156  Parody is a defense to copy-
right infringement if, on balance, the four statutory factors laid
out in Section 107 of the Copyright Act support a finding of fair
use.157  Although the parody defense is an important part of
the U.S. copyright scheme, it is fundamentally at odds with the
purpose of moral intellectual property rights—namely, to pro-
tect the “honor or reputation” of artists and their works.158
Consider the song at issue in the seminal parody case Camp-
bell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.159  Defendant 2 Live Crew created
a musical parody of the popular 1964 Roy Orbison song “Oh,
Pretty Woman,” substituting Orbison’s “predictable” lyrics with
crass and “shocking” ones.160  2 Live Crew argued that the
parody should be considered fair use because it served as a
social commentary and was “clearly intended to ridicule the
152 Spangler, supra note 68, at 1315. R
153 Yonover, supra note 86, at 115. R
154 Cross, supra note 141, at 272. R
155 See id. at 273.
156 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579–80 (1994).
157 Id.  The four fair use factors are (1) the purpose and character of the use,
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the
proportion used, and (4) the effect of the use on the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
158 Yonover, supra note 86, at 100. R
159 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572.
160 Id. at 572–73.
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white-bread original.”161  The Supreme Court did not disagree,
and it remanded the case for a fair use analysis.162  The Court
was unwilling to dismiss the parody defense in part because
the 2 Live Crew song had arguable social value.163  However,
the parody, by its very nature, poked fun at the original work,
and this might have seriously injured Roy Orbison’s reputa-
tion.  If Orbison had enjoyed moral intellectual property rights,
he might have been able to enjoin 2 Live Crew from distributing
its song, despite the fact that it may have been socially
useful.164
How, then, can we prevent moral intellectual property
rights from unduly curtailing socially useful artistic parodies?
One solution is to shift the burden of proof to moral rights
holders, allowing parodists the presumption of fair use.165
This burden shifting would make little difference in the “easi-
est” cases—parodies that obviously benefited society would
succeed on the fair use defense, and those that injured the
artist’s reputation without offering societal utility would fail.166
However, in more difficult cases, doubts would be “resolved in
favor of the parodist,” which would result in “more art rather
than less.”167  This solution elegantly balances artistic encour-
agement against the sanctity of the fair use doctrine, and no
language in section 107 prevents courts from engaging in bur-
den shifting.168  For moral rights claims where defendants as-
sert the parody defense, then, judges (or legislators) should
shift the burden to plaintiffs to show lack of fair use.
B. Beneficial Applications of Moral Intellectual Property
Rights in the United States: Music Torture and
Beyond
If the United States implemented the moral intellectual
property scheme described above, musicians would be able to
prevent the United States from using their works for torture.  It
161 Id. at 582.
162 Id. at 594.
163 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Suffice it to say now that parody has an
obvious claim to transformative value . . . .  Like less ostensibly humorous forms
of criticism, it can provide social benefit . . . .”).
164 Likely, Orbison would sue under his right to integrity, which aims to pro-
tect artists’ reputations by ensuring that their names are not attached to artworks
that have been altered by third parties. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying
text.
165 Yonover, supra note 86, at 116. R
166 Id. at 120.
167 Id. at 120–21.
168 Id. at 116.
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is clear that if artists were awarded withdrawal rights, disgrun-
tled musicians could choose to withdraw their musical works
from prisons engaged in music torture.  Even without with-
drawal rights, though, artists would likely succeed in enjoining
the United States from using their music under the right to
attribution.  In the Shostakovich case, a French court deter-
mined that a composer had been morally injured because the
presence of his music in a movie falsely indicated to consumers
that he had endorsed the anti-Russian themes in the film.169
Because the audience partially attributed the film to the com-
poser, the composer had the right to remove his music from the
film (and enjoin the current version of the film from playing).170
In the same way, Guantanamo prisoners—or fans who read
about music torture in the news—could assume that the use of
specific music at Guantanamo Bay suggested musician en-
dorsement of the torture practices there.  As a result, disap-
proving musicians could likely succeed on a moral-rights
infringement action under the right to attribution.
Furthermore, context can often alter the meaning of musi-
cal lyrics, which raises right-to-integrity questions.  For exam-
ple, take Bruce Springsteen’s “Born in the U.S.A.,” a
Guantanamo Bay favorite.171  Originally written about the Viet-
nam War, “the song presents a poignant critique of social ine-
qualities and our tragic failure to properly honor those who
serve and sacrifice for their country.”172  When it plays at
Guantanamo Bay, however, “the song’s seemingly jingoistic,
anthemic chorus takes center stage.  Context transforms the
tune . . . into a patriotic paean that aurally demarcates the
insider-outsider . . . divide separating soldiers and detain-
ees.”173  Similarly, when music torturers use Britney Spears’
“. . . Baby One More Time,” the lyric “hit me, baby, one more
time” transforms from a sexual advance into a twisted plea for
violence.174  Because context may sometimes transform the
169 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
170 See Yonover, supra note 86, at 89. R
171 See McLaughlin, supra note 18; Tehranian, supra note 30, at 19. R
172 Tehranian, supra note 30, at 21. R
173 Id. at 22.
174 Andy Worthington, A History of Music Torture in the “War on Terror,” HUF-
FINGTON POST BLOG (Jan. 15, 2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
andy-worthington/a-history-of-music-tortur_b_151109.html [http://perma.cc/
8EU9-BPVF].  The lyrics “when I’m not with you I lose my mind” and “Boy, you got
me blinded” are also particularly poignant.  Note that although cleverly twisted
lyrics may be particularly distressing to musicians, they may not have much effect
on the prisoners.  As Guantanamo Prisoner Ruhal Ahmed explained, music
“makes you feel like you are going mad.  You lose the plot and it’s very scary to
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meaning of a musical work, some musicians may have right-to-
integrity claims against the United States for playing their
songs for torture purposes.
Whether an artist uses the attribution, integrity, or with-
drawal right to frame her claim, though, she is likely to succeed
because the unauthorized use of one’s music for torture pur-
poses is an affront to the personality theories upon which the
moral rights system is built.175  If artists consider their work to
be a part of themselves, it must cause significant internal dis-
comfort to have that work involved in inflicting pain upon
others, especially if music torture is something with which the
artist philosophically disagrees.176  Of course, not every musi-
cian opposes the United States using music for homeland se-
curity purposes.177  This means that there will always be music
available for music torture and ensures that such pragmatic
concerns would not weigh on the minds of legal decision mak-
ers when granting artists moral relief.  Moral rights, in short,
are a neat solution to the music torture problem.
The introduction of moral rights into U.S. intellectual prop-
erty law could also help solve a number of other problems
musicians face under the current intellectual property scheme.
For example, when political campaigns use music at campaign
rallies, the musicians often protest if they do not support the
candidate in question.178  Just as in the music torture scena-
rio, musicians do not have many legal avenues available if they
wish to distance their music from an ideologically repugnant
political candidate.  Copyright protection is next to useless at
political rallies, because “the copyright holder to the musical
composition at issue has invariably agreed to a blanket per-
formance-license regime that enables venues to play the musi-
cal composition without regard to who is using the venue and
for what purpose.”179  Other intellectual property theories tend
to be ill fitting,180 leaving artists without rights.  In Henley v.
DeVore, for example, Charles DeVore, an assemblyman who
was seeking the Republican nomination for one of California’s
think that you might go crazy because of all the music, because of the loud noise,
and because after a while you don’t hear the lyrics at all, all you hear is heavy
banging.” Id.
175 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. R
176 Trent Reznor’s quote at text accompanying note 30, supra, nicely eluci- R
dates this feeling.
177 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
178 For a number of high-profile examples of this phenomenon, see Tehranian,
supra note 30, at 12–14. R
179 Id. at 14.
180 See supra Subparts I.B–C.
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senate seats, produced a YouTube campaign video using the
music from the Don Henley song “All She Wants to Do Is
Dance.”181  DeVore personally rewrote the lyrics to the song (its
new title was “All She Wants to Do Is Tax”) and had them sung
over a karaoke track of the original.182  Henley, a prominent
musician and former member of the Eagles, sued under a num-
ber of different theories including copyright and Lanham Act
false endorsement.183  However, Henley was ultimately unsuc-
cessful, in part because he did not hold the copyright to the
song (although the songwriter managed to recover).184  Fur-
ther, because Henley’s voice had a different sonic quality from
that of the DeVore singer, he did not succeed on his false en-
dorsement claim.185  “The real injury to Henley, if there was
one, was not the idea of consumer confusion as to sponsorship
or affiliation; it was the semiotic recasting of his songs into
something he never intended them to be.”186  Although Henley
failed to recover, armed with withdrawal, attribution, and in-
tegrity rights, Henley could have prevented DeVore from appro-
priating his music in a way that Henley considered repugnant.
The introduction of expansive moral intellectual property
into the U.S. copyright scheme could even help combat online
music piracy.187  One theory is that yesterday’s major record
companies caused a “commodification” of music by greedily
raising prices while decreasing music quality and artist royalty
payments, which caused consumers to become resentful.188
These angry consumers did not feel guilty about stealing music
when it became available online, in part because they felt labels
had been “stealing” from artists and consumers for years.189
Moral rights, which stem from the belief that music is not
merely a commodity, but an extension of the artist’s per-
sonhood, could help to “restore the value placed on music and
help consumers decide once again that it is worth paying
for.”190
181 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147–48 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  DeVore actually appro-
priated two of Henley’s songs for his campaign.  For simplicity’s sake, the analysis
here considers only one.
182 Id. at 1149.
183 Id. at 1147, 1149.
184 Id. at 1148.
185 Id. at 1168. See Tehranian, supra note 30, at 26–28. R
186 Tehranian, supra note 30, at 27. R
187 See Spangler, supra note 68, at 1322. R
188 Id. at 1318–20.
189 Id. at 1320–21.
190 Id. at 1322.
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CONCLUSION
The process of creating art is a deeply personal one—it
requires the artist to put a piece of her soul into her work, so
that the work might one day touch the soul of an observer.
Music torture, by contrast, is impersonal, dehumanizing, and
isolating.  It is easy to see why artists should be upset when
their carefully crafted music abets violent acts.  But while we
might understand artists’ concerns about music torture, the
current intellectual property system affords artists little to no
relief.  The expansion of moral rights in the United States is a
promising solution.
The United States is a young nation, and as such, its eco-
nomic development has historically been a dominant focus.191
Established European countries, by contrast, have been able to
expend more energy on art creation and artists’ rights, espe-
cially in the realm of moral intellectual property.  Today,
though, the United States is becoming more of a global artistic
competitor.  Artists such as Edward Hopper, Georgia O’Keefe,
and Andy Warhol have assumed prominent roles on the world-
wide stage.192  It is time for the United States to improve its
artistic protections, or risk falling behind.  With expanded
moral intellectual property rights, the United States can boost
its status as an artistic powerhouse and protect the sanctity of
its artists.
191 Yonover, supra note 86, at 86. R
192 Id. at 91–92.
